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ABSTRACT
This study evaluates the effects of the audit committee and the fiscal council with their different characteristics on earnings 
quality in Brazil. The proxies of earnings quality used are: relevance of accounting information, timeliness, and conditional 
conservatism. The sample consists of Brazilian companies listed on the Brazilian Securities, Commodities, and Futures 
Exchange (BM&FBOVESPA) with annual liquidity above 0.001 within the period from 2010 to 2013. Data were collected 
from the database Comdinheiro and the Reference Forms of companies available on the website of the Brazilian Securities 
and Exchange Commission (CVM) or the BM&FBOVESPA. The samples used in the study totaled 718, 688, and 722 
observations for the value relevance, timeliness, and conditional conservatism models, respectively. The results indicate 
that different arrangements of the fiscal council and the existence of the audit committee differently impact the accounting 
information properties. The presence of the fiscal council positively impacted the relevance of equity, while the presence 
of the audit committee, the relevance of earnings. Conditional conservatism is evidenced in the group of companies with 
a permanent fiscal council, demonstrating that it is significant as a governance mechanism, rather than the installation for 
temporary operation when asked by shareholders in an ordinary general meeting. The presence of both showed significant 
earnings for the market, but they were not timely, something which exposes restriction to the relevance found. Lastly, the 
powered fiscal council showed a positive association only concerning the relevance of equity.
Keywords: earnings quality, fiscal council, audit committee, corporate governance, powered fiscal council.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Th e quality of accounting fi gures is intrinsically linked 
to the quality of corporate governance (Sloan, 2001). 
Accounting provides information, among other aspects, 
concerning executives’ performance that are needed by 
most corporate governance mechanisms to eff ectively 
operate in addressing agency problems (Bushman & 
Smith, 2001; Sloan, 2001).
Previous studies have shown that the board of directors 
and its structure and composition, as well as that of its 
committees, aff ect the quality of accounting fi gures, 
indicating that good corporate governance practices 
benefi t shareholders (Trapp, 2009; Vafeas, 2000; Xie, 
Davidson & Dadalt, 2003). In addition, the eff orts to 
grasp the function of the audit committee, an advisory 
body of the board of directors directly responsible for the 
supervision of accounting processes (Instituto Brasileiro 
de Governança Corporativa [IBGC], 2009, 2010; U.S. 
Government, 2002) have also increased.
Brazil has a characteristic different from other 
countries due to the potential presence of the fi scal 
council in companies, according to Law 6,404/1976, the 
so-called Brazilian Corporate Law (Brasil, 1976). It is a 
body that can be set up and have its members elected 
at a shareholders’ general meeting as an instrument to 
inspect the managers’ acts. Among its functions, the fi scal 
council is responsible for examining and commenting on 
the fi nancial statements audited by an external auditor 
(Brasil, 1976; IBGC, 2010).
In the Brazilian environment, we may ponder that both 
the board of directors and its committees and the fi scal 
council have functions that aim at reducing information 
asymmetry, something which can improve the quality of 
information disclosed to the market, in addition to provide 
more eﬃ  cient monitoring of executives. Th ese bodies can 
contribute to reduce the agency confl icts highlighted by 
Jensen and Meckling (1976).
Studies such as Ahmed and Henry (2012), Baxter 
and Cotter (2009), and Wild (1996) have provided 
evidence that the audit committee improves the quality 
of accounting fi gures. In Brazil, Trapp (2009) argues that 
the fi scal council is related to lower levels of earnings 
management.
In this way, investigating and understanding the 
relation between functions of the fi scal council and the 
audit committee and earnings quality has proved to be 
a research opportunity poorly addressed by literature 
and convenient to the Brazilian environment. Also, 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), as a 
consequence of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) (U.S. 
Government, 2002), which provided for mandatory 
implementation of an audit committee, authorized the 
Brazilian companies holding American Depositary 
Receipts (ADRs) listed on the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE) to structure corporate governance, considering 
the fi scal council with an overlap to the audit committee, 
i.e. it is up to the fi scal council to adapt, also taking the 
functions of this committee, becoming the so-called 
‘powered fi scal council.’
The audit committee and the fiscal council have 
common functions related to the generation and reporting 
of accounting information, but they are diff erent in many 
ways, emerging discussions about the establishment of 
one or the other. Th e same applies to the implementation 
of the powered fi scal council (Furuta & Santos, 2010; 
PricewaterhouseCoopers [PwC], 2007).
Th e two bodies should not be regarded as mutually 
excluding, since their functions, responsibilities, hierarchy, 
and composition are diff erent. First, they occupy diff erent 
hierarchical positions in the organization: the audit 
committee is subordinate to the board of directors, 
preferably formed by independent representatives of 
this, while the fi scal council is autonomous and not linked 
to any management body, it consists of shareholders’ 
representatives. In this way, the independence rules are 
also diff erent from each other; regarding the functions 
and competences, the audit committee is delegated with 
activities specifi c to the ‘management’ function, and the 
fi scal council is an institutional tool of the shareholders’ 
right to exert control over management (Furuta & Santos, 
2010; PwC, 2007). In this way, adopting the two bodies 
in the same organization could contribute to greater 
transparency in managers’ actions and better corporate 
governance practices (Santos, 2009).
Thus, considering the corporate governance 
environment in the Brazilian capital market, this study 
investigates the following research question: what are 
the eff ects of the audit committee and the fi scal council 
on earnings quality of public companies listed on the 
BM&FBOVESPA?
Th is study aims to evaluate the eff ects of the audit 
committee and the fi scal council and their diff erent 
arrangements – types of fi scal council (when it exists, 
either as permanent or temporary), permanent, temporary, 
or powered fi scal council – on earnings quality in Brazil.
As proxies to measure earnings quality, the relevance, 
timeliness, and conditional conservatism models were 
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adopted, according to Almeida (2010), Barth, Landsman 
and Lang (2008), and Lopes and Walker (2008).
Th e contribution of this research lies on the fact 
that there is an extensive international literature 
on earnings quality and its relation with corporate 
governance mechanisms, unlike the Brazilian reality. 
Also, the Brazilian literature is incipient to consolidate the 
understanding of the relation between the audit committee 
and the fi scal council with fi nancial statement quality. 
Finally, this research brings as a diff erential feature to 
the international literature the inclusion of the fi scal 
council as a mechanism of corporate governance and its 
interactions with earnings quality.
Th e results indicate diff erent eff ects of the bodies 
under analysis on earnings quality proxies. Th e fi scal 
council, in general, either permanent or temporary, 
has positive association with the book value relevance 
and the audit committee with net income. At the same 
time, the results for companies that have permanently 
installed fi scal councils show that both the relevance of 
equity and net income is increased, as well as the timely 
recognition of economic losses (conditional conservatism), 
demonstrating the importance of permanent installation 
of the fi scal council to control fi nancial report. Th e fi rms 
with a powered fi scal council showed relevance only 
for equity among all the earnings quality metrics used, 
something which contributes to the existing discussion 
between scholars and professionals about the loss of focus 
on the attributions of this body: for instance, PwC (2007).
This study is divided, after this Introduction, as 
follows: 2. Th eoretical framework and development of 
hypotheses; 3. Methodology, where models’ details, sample 
development, and estimators are presented; 4. Analysis of 
results by each model and their variations; 5. Robustness 
analysis; and 6. Final remarks.
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND DEVELOPMENT OF HYPOTHESES
Bushman and Smith (2001) argue that corporate 
governance mechanisms are the means by which 
controlling agents are disciplined to act in accordance 
with investors’ interests. Accounting is a part of the set 
of corporate governance mechanisms, as it promotes 
greater transparency regarding the fi nancial performance 
of fi rms within a period and the dissemination of this 
information aims to reduce information asymmetry and 
agency problems (Bushman, Chen, Engel & Smith, 2004).
Th ere is no precise and fully reliable metric in the 
literature to measure earnings quality, as discussed by 
Dechow, Ge and Schrand (2010), but researchers have 
developed over the years several models that seek to 
capture diff erent properties of accounting fi gures.
Almeida (2010), Barth et al. (2008), and Lopes and 
Walker (2008) used similar properties to measure earnings 
quality, such as relevance, timeliness, and conditional 
conservatism, the same used in this study.
2.1 Audit Committee
The audit committee is an advisory body of the 
board of directors consisting, preferably, of independent 
board members. It assures to the board of directors the 
control over earnings quality and internal controls, and 
it is regarded as an essential mechanism in corporate 
governance (IBGC, 2009).
Th e concept of audit committee is not new. Since 
1939 and 1940, the NYSE and the SEC, respectively, 
recommend setting up audit committees as a response 
to the case McKesson and Robbins in the late 1930s. 
In subsequent years, the number of companies with 
established committees signifi cantly increased and the 
U.S. Congress, the SEC, accountants, and others expressed 
interest and support for this body (Birkett, 1986).
Th e NYSE and National Association of Securities 
Dealers Automated Quotations (NASDAQ) established, 
in 1978 and 1989, respectively, as requirements for 
listing on their stock exchanges, the establishment of 
an audit committee consisting of fully independent 
members. In 1999, they jointly developed the Blue 
Ribbon Committee on Improving the Eff ectiveness of 
Corporate Audit Committees, with the purpose of making 
recommendations on the composition and operation 
of audit committees, subsequently adopted by the SEC.
Th e audit committee gained prominence worldwide 
aft er the U.S. scandals, mainly involving Enron and 
WorldCom, which prompted the SOX enactment by the 
U.S. Congress, in July 2002. Th e SOX introduced corporate 
governance rules, among others, aiming to ensure greater 
transparency to fi nancial reporting by the companies, also 
instituting mandatory establishment of this committee.
In Brazil, Law 6,404/1976 (Brasil, 1976) does not deal 
with the audit committee, but it regulates the general board 
of directors. In the country, the installation of a committee 
is not mandatory, except for fi nancial institutions and 
insurance companies, according to regulation by the 
National Monetary Council (CMN), the Central Bank 
Effects of the audit committee and the fiscal council on earnings quality in Brazil
232 R. Cont. Fin. – USP, São Paulo, v. 28, n. 74, p. 229-248, mai./ago. 2017
of Brazil (BACEN), and the National Council of Private 
Insurance (CNSP).
Accordingly, the audit committee has the function of 
inspecting the fi nancial reporting process (internal process 
management and integrity and eff ectiveness of internal 
controls) and internal and external audit, including the 
resolution of confl icts between executives and auditor.
Th e committee ensures the integrity and timeliness 
of financial information, as well as the interests of 
shareholders and other stakeholders (IBGC, 2010; U.S. 
Government, 2002). Th erefore, its activities are closely 
related to the fi nancial reporting quality (Klein, 2002; 
He, Labelle, Piot & Th ornton, 2009).
In Brazil, research addressing the infl uence of an 
audit committee as a governance mechanism on earnings 
quality is incipient, we may highlight Cunha, Hillesheim, 
Faveri and Rodrigues (2014) and Filipin (2012).
Cunha et al. (2014) investigated whether characteristics 
of the audit committee (size, expertise, and independence) 
refl ect on earnings management by Brazilian public 
companies listed on the BM&FBOVESPA and they 
concluded that none of the characteristics under study 
impacted on earnings management.
Using a portfolio of proxies to measure earnings 
quality, as in this study, Filipin (2012) sought to verify 
whether companies with an audit committee listed on 
the BM&FBOVESPA have better earnings quality; the 
results for these companies suggested greater relevance 
of accounting information, but less conservative and 
persistent net income.
Th e international literature is extensive and the authors 
generally share the same hypothesis about improving 
fi nancial reporting quality (Chtourou, Bédard & Courteu, 
2001; Felo, Krishnamurthy & Solieri, 2003; Xie et al., 
2003).
Before the audit committee became mandatory in 
the United States of America (USA), Dechow, Sloan 
and Sweeney (1996) found evidence that companies 
that manage their earnings were less likely to have this 
committee installed than other fi rms. Wild (1996) noticed 
the reaction of the U.S. market to the release of fi nancial 
statements before and after the establishment of an 
audit committee and found that the market reaction to 
disclosure of fi nancial statements aft er the establishment 
of a committee is greater than in previous periods.
Ahmed and Henry (2012) and Baxter and Cotter 
(2009) investigated, in Australian companies, whether 
voluntary installation of the audit committee impacted 
the earnings quality. Baxter and Cotter (2009) found 
evidence of reduced earnings management practices, 
while Ahmed and Henry (2012) showed a positive impact 
on unconditional conservatism and a negative impact on 
conditional conservatism. In this context, the fi rst research 
hypothesis on the presence of an audit committee in 
companies listed on the BM&FBOVESPA is presented:
H1: the audit committee enhances the fi nancial 
reporting quality.
2.2 Fiscal Council
In Brazil, the fi scal council is an organ provided for in 
Law 6,404/1976 (Brasil, 1976) and the company’s statute 
will provide for its operation, which may be permanent or 
installed by the general meeting at shareholders’ request. 
When installed, it must consist of at least 3 and at most 5 
members and substitutes in equal numbers, shareholders 
or not (Brasil, 1976).
Th e fi scal council is a body independent from the 
company’s board and executives and its competences 
are set in article 163 of Law 6,404/1976 (Brasil, 1976), 
i.e. it reports directly to the shareholders at the meetings. 
Th is body inspects the actions taken by the company’s 
board and board of directors, comments on proposals 
by administration bodies, as well as it examines and 
comments on the fi nancial statements audited by the 
external audit, seeking to preserve shareholders’ rights.
Both the IBGC, from a professional perspective, and 
scholars (Carvalhal-da-Silva & Leal, 2005; Tinoco, Escuder 
& Yoshitake, 2011; Trapp, 2009), regard the fi scal council 
as a part of the corporate governance system in Brazil. 
Th e fact that the fi scal council is a direct representative 
of shareholders inspecting executives’ management can 
have a great infl uence on the reduction of agency confl ict 
and informational asymmetry, something which makes 
it a signifi cant control mechanism. Also, Tinoco et al. 
(2011) claim that the fi scal council collaborates with 
those who are far from control and power (especially 
minority shareholders).
Trapp (2009) sought to evaluate the direct intersection 
of a fi scal council as a good corporate governance practice 
to reduce earnings management. Evidence indicates that 
these factors, considering the existence and qualifi cation 
of the members of a fi scal council, are related to lower 
levels of discretionary accruals.
Finally, Carvalhal-da-Silva and Leal (2005) claim, 
when constructing the Corporate Governance Index, 
that the existence of a permanent fi scal council in the 
organization is more eff ective to monitor and arrange 
company’s management than the council installed 
only at shareholders’ request. It is assumed that a fi scal 
council installed regardless of shareholders’ will and on 
a continued basis provides the company with greater 
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power from this mechanism in the corporate governance 
system, mainly by increasing earnings quality.
In this context, the second research hypothesis on the 
presence of a fi scal council in companies listed on the 
BM&FBOVESPA is presented:
H2: the fi scal council enhances earnings quality.
Additionally, to analyze the second hypothesis, we 
investigate on a methodological basis the various fi scal 
council arrangements (permanent and temporary).
2.3 Powered Fiscal Council
An imposition of the SOX was mandatory installation 
of the audit committee in companies listed on all the 
U.S. stock exchanges, something which also aff ected 
foreign companies that issue ADRs in the U.S. market 
(Furuta & Santos, 2010). In the Brazilian case, aft er an 
agreement between the Brazilian Securities and Exchange 
Commission (CVM) and the SEC, in 2003, mandatory 
installation of the audit committee was abolished 
if the company used the fi scal council, adapting it to 
the functions of a committee, so that the fi scal council 
incorporates new responsibilities and functions (hereaft er, 
powered fi scal council).
According to the IBGC (2009), considering the 
legal attributions of the fi scal council provided for in 
Law 6,404/1976 (Brasil, 1976), the possibility that this 
body takes any administration activity is excluded. Th e 
creation of a powered fi scal council does not contradict 
this understanding, since the fi scal council is careful not 
to act as an advisor or assessor concerning management 
decisions. Accordingly, certain activities that cannot be 
delegated by the board of directors or executives, such 
as hiring audit and ‘non-audit’ services, should not be 
assigned to the fi scal council, since they are provided for 
by article 142 of Law 6,404/1976 (Brasil, 1976) as duties 
of the board of directors.
PwC (2007) discusses the strengths and weaknesses of 
adopting a powered fi scal council. According to this study, 
opponents argue that the fi scal council is an institutional 
tool to exert shareholders’ inspection does not serve the 
purpose of the audit committee to be a management 
instrument of the board of directors. In addition, the 
fi scal council has functions and duties diff erent from 
those predicted for the audit committee, such as providing 
opinions on proposals to change company’s capital, issue 
debentures, investment plans, or capital budgets, among 
others, something which can lead to loss of focus on 
specifi c attributions of the audit committee.
According to Santos (2009), many Brazilian companies 
that issue ADRs still prefer to strictly comply with the 
SOX requirements and not install the powered fi scal 
council; this is most likely due to a market-driven and 
strategic issue of making their stocks available in the U.S. 
market, since the acquirer of these stocks is more familiar 
with the audit committee than with any other type of 
monitoring body. However, Calazans (2003) highlights 
that the constitution of an audit committee in Brazilian 
companies might increase their cost and this additional 
cost can oft en be higher than the benefi t generated.
Furuta and Santos (2010) investigated the perspective 
of executives from companies operating in Brazil and 
issuing ADRs and that of market analysts concerning 
the formation of an audit committee or a powered fi scal 
council. Th e results indicated there was no consensus of 
opinion that the fi scal council is more adaptable than the 
audit committee to the Brazilian business environment 
if the functions of these bodies are diff erent and if the 
costs associated with committee formation are relevant.
It is assumed, then, that the fi scal council improves 
earnings quality, since it absorbs, in addition to the legal 
functions of the fi scal council, the functions of the audit 
committee, expanding its scope of action. Also, companies 
with a powered fi scal council are listed on the U.S. stock 
exchanges, something which indicates greater rigor in 
corporate governance. Th us, the third research hypothesis 
is presented:
H3: the powered fiscal council improves the 
fi nancial reporting quality.
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2.4 Audit Committee and Fiscal Council
Th e fi scal council and the audit committee occupy 
diff erent hierarchical positions in the organization: the 
second is subordinate to the board of directors, preferably 
consisting of independent members, while the fi rst is 
set up by the general meeting, a body which represents 
controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. 
Unlike the committee, the fi scal council is autonomous 
and is not linked to any organization’s body, and it must 
report to the shareholders directly at the meetings.
Th e bodies also have diff erences in their functions 
and duties. Audit committees are delegated with activities 
inherent to the ‘management’ function, i.e. it is an advisory 
mechanism made available to the board of directors to 
fulfi ll its tasks. Among the legal attributions of the fi scal 
council, the possibility of exercising any activity inherent 
to management is excluded. Th e council activities are 
carried out according to the role of wide and unrestricted 
inspection of managers’ legal and statutory duties, at 
shareholders’ request, as a decision of the general meeting. 
In this way, it is an institutional mechanism to exert the 
shareholders’ right of control on the executive’s decision 
(IBGC, 2009; PwC, 2007).
Among the diff erences between these bodies that 
may directly interfere with accounting information, 
we highlight the fact that the functions of an audit 
committee are more specifi c and focused on the fi nancial 
reporting process, unlike the fi scal council, which besides 
recommending whether the fi nancial statements can be 
approved also inspects the managers’ acts.
Each body has its function in the hypothesis of 
enhancing fi nancial reporting quality, either advising 
the board of directors (audit committee) or inspecting 
and reporting to the shareholders (fi scal council). In 
this way, the acceptance of both bodies in the same 
organization refers to the reasoning that they are not 
mutually excluding. Th is trend might lead to greater 
transparency of managers’ actions and adoption of better 
corporate governance practices, since a large number of 
views on control coexisting in the same environment 
could contribute to ensure continuity in the organization, 
regardless of individual or group interests (Santos, 2009).
Based on the assumption that better corporate 
governance practices in the organization improve the 
quality of fi nancial reporting, it is expected that adopting 
the two bodies has a positive impact on this relation. Th us, 
the fourth research hypothesis is:
H4: the presence of the audit committee and the 
fi scal council, simultaneously, enhances earnings 
quality.
3. METHODOLOGY
The study population comprises active publicly-
traded corporations listed on the BM&FBOVESPA that 
have data available for the period within 2010 and 2013. 
To start constructing the sample, only companies with 
annual liquidity above 0.001 were selected. Financial 
institutions and funds were excluded from the sample, 
because they have a specifi c accounting standard and 
regulation. Observations with empty cells, with values 
equal to 0, and errors in the variables of interest of each 
model, as well as the companies that did not provide the 
Reference Form, were also excluded.
Th e accounting and market data were obtained from 
the database Comdinheiro. Information on the fi scal 
council and the audit committee was obtained from the 
company Reference Forms, available at the websites of 
the BM&FBOVESPA and the CVM.
Earnings quality models were estimated using the 
ordinary least squares (OLS) method, with robust standard 
errors clustered by fi rm. Th is estimation method has been 
widely used in accounting and fi nance studies (Almeida, 
2010; Giroud & Mueller, 2010; Lopes & Walker, 2008).
As a method to exclude outliers, observations with 
extreme values  above 3 standard deviations from the 
standardized mean value of each variable were excluded. 
Table 1 shows how observations were fi ltered, resulting 
in the fi nal study sample by model.
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Table 1 Sample selection
Relevance Timeliness Conservatism
Initial database (4 years) 1,592 1,592 1,592
(-)Annual liquidity below 0.001 (713) (713) (713)
(-)Financial institutions and funds (91) (91) (91)
(-)Companies that did not provide RF (10) (10) (10)
(=)Sample with outliers 778 778 778
(-)Empty cells (by model) (32) (54) (32)
(-) Outliers (by model) (28) (36) (24)
(=) Final sample 718 688 722
RF = Company Reference Forms.
Source: Prepared by the authors.
Since there is no single way to measure earnings 
quality, this study was based on the metrics used by Lopes 
and Walker (2008), which capture earnings quality, based 
on its properties, among them relevance, timeliness, and 
conditional conservatism. It is believed, therefore, that 
more relevant accounting fi gures, greater timely loss 
recognition (bad news), and more timely information 
correspond to better fi nancial reporting process.
Th e model that tests the value relevance considers the 
information content of net income and book value as a 
function of share price.
Th is study evaluates the eff ect of the existence of a fi scal 
council in Brazilian companies and its variations: general 
fi scal council (when it exists, either on a permanent or 
temporary basis), permanent, temporary, or powered fi scal 
council, audit committee, of both organs simultaneously 
and one or the other on relevance. All these combinations 
are controlled by dummy variables in alternate models. 
To do this, model 1 was prepared, which has dummy 
variables and control variables (CV), as follows:
Ri,t = β 0 + β 1.NIi,t + β 2.ΔNIi,t + β 3.Cn + β 4.NIi,t*Cn + β 5. ΔNIi,t*Cn+ ∑  .βn.Control + εi,t
where: Pi,t is the share price of company i in year t adjusted 
by dividends and splits (four months aft er the end of the 
year) and scaled by share price in t-1, NIi,t is earnings 
per share of  company i in year t scaled by share price in 
t-1, BVi,t is equity per share of company i in year t, scaled 
by share price in t-1i, Cn is the variable that takes value 
1 for FCn, AC, ACFC or ACOFC [where: FCn = dummy 
variable if fi rm i has a general fi scal council installed 
(FC1), a permanent fi scal council (FC2), or a powered 
fi scal council (FC3); AC = dummy variable if fi rm i has 
an audit committee installed; ACFC = dummy variable 
if fi rm i has both, fi scal council and audit committee 
installed; ACOFC = dummy variable if fi rm i has a fi scal 
council or an audit committee installed] in each dummy, 
otherwise it is considered as 0.
Th e CVs used in this research were fi rm size (S), 
leverage (LEV), and growth opportunity (GRO) measured 
by the natural logarithm of total assets, total debt divided 
by total assets, and percentage growth of net revenues, 
respectively.
Lopes (2009) states that net income can infl uence 
price over a long period of time. Th us, the model to test 
timeliness aims at revealing whether net income and its 
variation can explain stock return. Model 2 is presented 
below, it has been developed in this research, which sought 
to identify the eff ect on timeliness.
Pi,t = β0 + β1.NIi,t + β2.BVi,t + β3.Cn + β4.NIi,t*Cn + β5.BVi,t*Cn+∑  .βn.Control + εi,t 
n
1
n
1
1
2
Effects of the audit committee and the fiscal council on earnings quality in Brazil
236 R. Cont. Fin. – USP, São Paulo, v. 28, n. 74, p. 229-248, mai./ago. 2017
where: Ri,t is return on (the most liquid class) share of 
company i in year t adjusted by dividends and splits (four 
months aft er the end of the year) and scaled by share price 
in t-1, NIi,t is earnings per share of company i in year t 
and scaled by share price in t-1, and ΔBVi,t are changes in 
net income per share of company i in year t and scaled 
by share price in t-1 (Cn according to model 1).
Th e conditional conservatism model used is that 
developed by Basu (1997). Th e model is based on the 
concept that net income is, in its nature, conservative in 
a conditional sense (asymmetric recognition between 
losses and gains) and it anticipates bad news in relation 
to good news. Th e model relates net income to stock 
return. Model 3 is presented below:
where: NIi,t is the earnings per share of company i in year t, 
scaled by share price at t-1, Di,t is the dummy for return, i.e. 
1 for negative return and 0 for positive return of company 
i in year t, and Ri,t is return on share (the most liquid share 
class) of company i in year t adjusted by dividends and 
splits (four months aft er the end of the year) and scaled 
by share price at t-1 (Cn according to model 1).
It is expected that the coeﬃ  cients of variables of interest 
from interactions with variables related to the existence 
of the fi scal council, audit committee, both of them, one 
or the other, permanent fi scal council and powered fi scal 
council are positive and statistically signifi cant in all 
models.
4. ANALYSIS OF RESULTS
Table 2 shows sample composition according to the 
existence of the bodies under analysis. Th e results are 
presented for the total sample (annual stock liquidity 
above 0.001) without excluding outliers. 
Table 2 Global composition of the  scal council and the audit committee in Brazil between 2010 and 2013
Bodies/observations 2010 2011 2012 2013 2010-2013
Audit Committee 61 61 65 67 254
Fiscal council 111 109 117 120 457
Permanent  fi scal council 48 47 47 46 188
Temporary fi scal council 63 62 70 74 269
Powered fi scal council 9 10 9 10 38
Permanent  powered fi scal council 9 9 8 7 33
Temporary powered fi scal council 0 1 1 3 5
Fiscal council and audit committee 34 33 36 38 141
Permanent  fi scal council and audit committee 19 18 22 22 81
Temporary fi scal council and audit committee 15 15 14 16 60
None 53 60 46 49 208
Observations 191 197 192 198 778
Source: Prepared by the authors.
It is veriﬁ ed that the most common practice in Brazil 
is adopting a ﬁ scal council, since 457 observations 
(companies-year) had this body installed within the 
four years surveyed. The presence of a powered ﬁ scal 
council is noticed in 38 observations of the sample and 
it corresponds to companies that issue ADR and did not 
install the audit committee.
In Brazil, the installation of an audit committee 
is voluntary, except for financial institutions and 
insurance companies, so that its existence is found in 
254 observations. There are 208 observations from ﬁ rms 
that have neither installed a ﬁ scal council or an audit 
NIi,t = β 0 + β 1.Di,t + β 2.Ri,t + β 3.Ri,t*Di,t + β 4.Cn + β 5.Di,t*Cn + β 6.Ri,t*Cn + β 7.Ri,t*Di,t*Cn+ ∑  .βn.Control + εi,t
n
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committee, something which may suggest weakness in 
the corporate governance system and lower monitoring 
of managers in these companies.
Table 3 displays the descriptive statistics of variables in 
the earnings quality models explained in the methodology.
Table 3 Descriptive statistics of earnings quality models
Variables Observations Mean value Median Standard deviation Minimum Maximum
Relevance model
P 718 1.004 0.980 0.378 0.063 2.155
NI 718 -0.024 0.051 0.485 -5.072 1.905
BV 718 0.553 0.619 1.856 -23.580 9.405
S 718 15.020 15.029 1.560 10.333 20.069
GRO 718 0.158 0.129 0.373 -2.631 3.392
LEV 718 0.631 0.578 0.422 0.009 4.341
FC1 718 0.599 1 0.490 0 1
FC2 718 0.251 0 0.434 0 1
FC3 718 0.051 0 0.221 0 1
AC 718 0.340 0 0.474 0 1
ACFC 718 0.191 0 0.393 0 1
ACOFC 718 0.748 1 0.434 0 1
Timeliness model
R 688 0.001 -0.001 0.288 -2.457 3.112
NI 688 -0.018 0.053 0.489 -5.072 1.905
∆NI 688 -0.027 0.002 0.464 -4.634 3.508
S 688 15.060 15.040 1.511 10.471 20.069
GRO 688 0.159 0.130 0.366 -2.631 3.392
LEV 688 0.626 0.576 0.422 0.009 4.341
FC1 688 0.610 1 0.488 0 1
FC2 688 0.254 0 0.436 0 1
FC3 688 0.053 0 0.226 0 1
AC 688 0.340 0 0.474 0 1
ACFC 688 0.192 0 0.394 0 1
ACOFC 688 0.759 1 0.428 0 1
Conservatism model
NI 722 -0.023 0.051 0.484 -5.072 1.905
R 722 -0.010 -0.001 0.393 -4.035 4.000
D 722 0.514 1 0.500 0.000 1.000
S 722 15.018 15.023 1.546 10.471 20.069
GRO 722 0.160 0.130 0.373 -2.631 3.392
LEV 722 0.630 0.577 0.422 0.009 4.341
FC1 722 0.601 1 0.490 0 1
FC2 722 0.252 0 0.435 0 1
FC3 722 0.051 0 0.220 0 1
AC 722 0.338 0 0.473 0 1
ACFC 722 0.190 0 0.392 0 1
ACOFC 722 0.749 1 0.434 0 1
Note: Pi,t is the share price of company i in year t adjusted by dividends and splits (four months after the end of the year) and 
scaled by share price in t-1, NIi,t is earnings per share of  company i in year t scaled by share price in t-1, BVi,t is equity per share 
of company i in year t, scaled by share price in t-1, R is annual return of  rm i in period t (four months after the beginning of the 
year), and ∆NIit is pro t variance per share of  rm i in period t. The variables P, LPA, PLA, R, ∆LPA are scaled by price in t-1 (four 
months after the beginning of the year).
ACFC = dummy variable if  rm i has both,  scal council and audit committee, installed; AC = dummy variable if  rm i has an 
audit committee installed; FCn = dummy variable if  rm i has a general  scal council installed (FC1), a permanent  scal council 
(FC2), or a powerful  scal council (FC3); D = dummy variable, considering 1 if the return is negative and 0, otherwise; LEV = 
leverage of  rm i in period t; GRO = revenue growth of  rm i in period t; ACOFC = dummy variable if  rm i has a  scal council 
or an audit committee installed; S = natural logarithm of total assets of  rm i in period t.
Source: Prepared by the authors.
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We observe greater data dispersion between the 
variables NI and GRO in all models, as well as the variables 
R and ΔNI in the timeliness model and R in conditional 
conservatism, since they have a standard deviation 
above mean value. For the variables body presence and 
arrangement, extreme values (minimum and maximum 
value) are always the same, due to the characteristics of 
these variables, but they have diff erences in dispersion 
between the various variables.
Table 4 shows the results referring to regressions for 
the relevance model.
Table 4 Results of the relevance model 
Model 1
Pi,t = β0 + β1.NIi,t + β2.BVi,t + β3.Cn + β4.NIi,t*Cn + β5.BVi,t*Cn + ∑  .βn.Control + εi,t
Column 1 2 3 4 5 6
Variables
General fi scal 
council
Audit
Committee
Both
Fiscal council or 
audit committee
Permanent fi scal 
council
Powered fi scal 
council
C = FC1 C = AC C = ACFC C = ACOFC C = FC2 C = FC3
NI
0.285*** 0.180*** 0.199*** 0.239*** 0.204*** 0.225***
(5.20) (3.41) (3.56) (4.48) (3.59) (3.76)
BV
-0.0422*** -0.0217** -0.0239*** -0.0366*** -0.0288*** -0.0306***
(-5.50) (-2.54) (-2.82) (-4.25) (-3.31) (-3.69)
Cn
0.0479 0.0296 0.107* 0.0440 -0.0706* -0.0508
(0.132) (0.67) (1.82) 1.29 (-1.92) (-0.68)
NI*Cn
-0.104 0.568*** 0.382*** -0.0328 0.431*** -0.150
(-1.16) (4.08) (3.08) (-0.35) (3.57) (-0.74)
BV*Cn
0.0281** 0.00306 -0.0314 0.0206* 0.0902*** 0.0568**
(2.60) (0.06) (-0.51) (1.76) (3.48) (2.51)
S
0.00479 0.00603 0.00378 0.00514 0.00306 0.00978
(0.50) (0.63) (0.39) (0.54) (0.29) (0.93)
GRO
0.106** 0.0837* 0.0948** 0.102** 0.0968** 0.0982**
(2.20) (1.81) (2.01) (2.01) (2.04) (2.04)
LEV
-0.104*** -0.104*** -0.105*** -0.102*** -0.109*** -0.109***
(-2.92) (-2.99) (-2.95) (-2.91) (-3.02) (-2.92)
Const.
0.969*** 0.968*** 0.998*** 0.958*** 1.026*** 0.932***
(6.51) (6.39) (6.51) (6.47) (6.06) (5.57)
R² (%) 10.98 12.5 11.47 10.39 11.82 10.32
F 6.45 9.66 9.57 5.21 10.44 9.75
Prob. F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Clusters (n) 210 210 210 210 210 210
Observations 718 718 718 718 718 718
Note: Pi,t is the share price of company i in year t adjusted by dividends and splits (four months after the end of the year) and 
scaled by share price in t-1, NIi,t is earnings per share of  company i in year t scaled by share price in t-1, BVi,t is equity per share of 
company i in year t, scaled by share price in t-1. The  rst line shows the coef cients and the second line, the t statistics. Standard 
error is robust and clustered by  rm. The variables P, LPA, and PLA are scaled by price in t-1 (four months after the beginning of 
the year).
ACFC = dummy variable if  rm i has both,  scal council and audit committee, installed; AC = dummy variable if  rm i has an 
audit committee installed; FCn = dummy variable if  rm i has a general  scal council installed (FC1), a permanent  scal council 
(FC2), or a powerful  scal council (FC3); Cn = variable that takes values  for FCn, AC, ACFC, or ACOFC; LEV = leverage of  rm 
i in period t; GRO = revenue growth of  rm i in period t; ACOFC = dummy variable if  rm i has a  scal council or an audit 
committee installed; S = natural logarithm of total assets of  rm i in period t.
***, **, *: signi cant at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
Source: Prepared by the authors.
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In column 1 of Table 4, the result for the eff ect of 
presence of a general fi scal council has a positive and 
signifi cant coeﬃ  cient only for the variable BV*FC1 (0.0281, 
t = 2.60). Th us, when the company chooses to set up the 
general fi scal council (permanent or temporary), the 
results suggest that equity is relevant to the market, unlike 
net income, which has a negative and non-signifi cant 
coeﬃ  cient, partly corroborating the results of Trapp 
(2009), which associates the fi scal council installation 
in Brazil with lower levels of earnings management.
Column 2 displays the results for the eff ect of an audit 
committee on relevance. Th e results are contrary to those 
of the general fi scal council – the variable NI*AC has a 
positive and signifi cant coeﬃ  cient of 0.568 (t = 4.08) –, 
suggesting that the presence of this control mechanism 
has a positive impact on relevance of the reported net 
income. Interaction with the variable BV is positive, but 
not signifi cant. Th ese results corroborate those of Filipin 
(2012) in Brazil and they are convergent with Baxter and 
Cotter (2009) and Wild (1996).
Th e eff ects of the presence of both (fi scal council and 
audit committee, simultaneously), represented in column 
3, show a positive and signifi cant coeﬃ  cient only for the 
variable NI*ACFC (0.382, t = 3.08), highlighting that the 
implementation of the two bodies, simultaneously, only 
aff ects net income. Also, in column 4, the existence of one 
or other body has an impact on equity relevance, since 
the variable BV*ACOFC has a positive and signifi cant 
coeﬃ  cient of 0.0206 (t = 1.76).
Th e eff ects of a permanent fi scal council are displayed 
in column 5. Th e results suggest for both the variable 
NI*FC2 and BV*FC2 positive and signifi cant coeﬃ  cients 
of 0.431 (t = 3.57) and 0.0902 (t = 3.48), respectively. In 
this way, the presence of the fi scal council on a permanent 
basis increases the relevance of net income and equity. 
Such a result confirms that the market recognizes 
accounting fi gures as more relevant information, thus 
of better quality, when there is a permanent presence of 
a fi scal council in the companies. Th is fi nding confi rms 
the claim of Carvalhal-da-Silva and Leal (2005) that 
permanent fi scal councils may be regarded as stronger 
governance mechanisms than when they are installed 
only at shareholders’ request.
Th e results for the eff ects of the powered fi scal council 
(column 6) have evidence similar to that from the general 
fi scal council: positive and signifi cant coeﬃ  cient only for 
the variable BV*FC3 (0.0568, t = 2.51) and negative for 
net income, although not signifi cant, showing impact 
only on equity relevance.
Table 5 displays the results for the timeliness model.
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Table 5 Results of the timeliness model 
Model 2
Ri,t = β0 + β1.NIi,t + β2.∆NIi,t + β3 .Cn + β4.NIi,t*Cn+ β5. ∆NIi,t*Cn + ∑  .βn.Control + εi,t
Column 1 2 3 4 5 6
Variables
General fi scal 
council
Audit
committee
Both
Fiscal council or 
audit committee
Permanent fi scal 
council
Powered fi scal 
council
C = FC1 C = AC C = ACFC C = ACOFC C = FC2 C = FC3
NI
0.171** 0.136*** 0.136*** 0.173** 0.121** 0.134***
(2.17) (2.77) (2.82) (2.10) (2.59) (2.85)
∆NI
0.0162 0.0143 0.0117 0.0227 0.0129 0.00970
(0.65) (0.86) (0.77) (0.78) (0.91) (0.86)
Cn
0.0228 0.00693 0.0149 0.0299 -0.0191 -0.0181
(1.17) (0.64) (1.58) (1.13) (-1.14) (-0.68)
NI*Cn
-0.0585 -0.0698 -0.114** -0.0598 0.231 -0.183***
(-0.70) (-1.13) (-1.99) (-0.69) (1.47) (-3.59)
∆NI*Cn
-0.00990 -0.0127 -0.00454 -0.0187 -0.0105 -0.0172
(-0.37) (-0.68) (-0.25) (-0.62) (-0.63) (-0.35)
S
0.00364 0.00562 0.00545 0.00267 0.00669 0.00737
(0.34) (0.52) (0.49) (0.27) (0.56) (0.59)
GRO
0.0348 0.0323 0.0319 0.0351 0.0258 0.0319
(1.17) (1.07) (1.05) (1.21) (0.84) (1.05)
LEV
0.0632 0.0569 0.0571 0.0652 0.0533 0.0572
(0.94) (0.89) (0.89) (0.97) (0.84) (0.89)
Const.
-0.109 -0.123 -0.121 -0.105 -0.131 -0.146
(-0.62) (-0.69) (-0.67) (-0.61) (-0.68) (-0.73)
R² (%) 5.22 4.92 4.97 5.27 5.57 4.97
F 2.58 2.68 2.75 2.53 2.75 3.44
Prob. F 0.010 0.008 0.006 0.012 0.055 0.001
Clusters (n) 209 209 209 209 209 209
Observations 688 688 688 688 688 688
Note: Ri,t is return on (the most liquid class) share of company i in year t adjusted by dividends and splits (four months after the 
end of the year) and scaled by share price in t-1, NIi,t is earnings per share of company i in year t and scaled by share price in t-1, 
and ∆BVi,t are changes in net income per share of company i in year t and scaled by share price in t-1. In the  rst line there are 
coef cients and in the second line, the t statistics. Standard error is robust and clustered by  rm. The variables R, LPA, and ∆LPA 
are scaled by price in t-1 (four months after the beginning of the year).
ACFC = dummy variable if  rm i has both,  scal council and audit committee, installed; AC = dummy variable if  rm i has an 
audit committee installed; FCn = dummy variable if  rm i has a general  scal council installed (FC1), a permanent  scal council 
(FC1), or a powerful  scal council (FC3); Cn = variable that takes values  for FCn, AC, ACFC, or ACOFC; LEV = leverage of  rm i 
in period t; GRO = revenue growth of  rm i in period t; ACOFC = dummy variable if  rm i has  scal council or audit committee 
installed; S = natural logarithm of total assets of  rm i in period t.
***, **, *: signi cant at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
Source: Prepared by the authors.
Th e models of columns 1, 2, 4, and 5 of Table 5 have, 
for the variables of interest, coeﬃ  cients with no statistical 
signifi cance, something which indicates that companies 
with a general fi scal council, an audit committee, and a 
permanent fi scal council do not raise market expectations 
in relation to net income and its contemporary variation 
to stock return.
Contrary to hypotheses 3 and 4, the results for a 
powered fi scal council and the presence of both have 
negative and signifi cant coeﬃ  cients for the variables 
NI*FC3 (-0.183, t = -0.68) and NI*ACFC (-0.114, t = 
-1.99), showing that their presence does not improve the 
timeliness of accounting fi gures, i.e. the market anticipates 
net income information content. Th is result, as well as 
the result for relevance, contributes to academic and 
professional discussions about the overlapping of actions 
taken by the powered fi scal council.
Table 6 shows the results of regressions for the 
conditional conservatism model.
n
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Table 6 Results of the conditional conservatism model 
Model 3
NIi,t = β0 + β1.Di,t + β2.Ri,t + β3.Ri,t*Di,t + β4.Cn + β5.Di,t*Cn+ β6.Ri,t*Cn + β7.Ri,t*Di,t*Cn+ ∑  .βn.Control + εi,t
Column 1 2 3 4 5 6
Variables
General fi scal 
council
Audit
committee
Both
Fiscal council or 
audit committee
Permanent fi scal 
council
Powered fi scal 
council
C = FC1 C = AC C = ACFC C = ACOFC C = FC2 C = FC3
R
0.0811 0.0437 0.0448 0.0773 0.0375 0.0436
(0.46) (0.41) (0.42) (0.44) (0.35) (0.41)
D
-0.0835* -0.0772 -0.0797** -0.0797 -0.0859* -0.0827**
(-1.91) (-1.59) (-2.03) (-1.18) (-1.96) (-2.41)
R*D
0.114 0.271 0.271 0.118 0.253 0.273
(0.54) (1.40) (1.40) (0.56) (1.33) (1.39)
Cn
-0.0117 -0.00479 0.00613 -0.0289 -0.00398 0.0526
(-0.39) (-0.16) (0.19) (-0.89) (-0.12) (0.75)
R*Cn
-0.0976 -0.0558 -0.150 -0.0897 0.153 -3.589
(-0.53) (-0.24) (-0.48) (-0.49) (1.00) (-0.84)
D*C
0.0716 0.0355 0.0191 0.0605 0.0734 -0.0145
(1.45) (0.62) (0.35) (0.88) (1.41) (-0.19)
R*D*Cn
1.489 1.354 0.552 1.475 0.764*** 2.304
(1.48) (1.63) (0.85) (1.50) (3.05) (0.40)
S
0.0135 0.0147 0.0143 0.0153 0.0126 0.0140
(0.89) (0.92) (0.88) (1.05) (0.75) (0.83)
GRO
-0.0329 -0.0136 -0.0187 -0.0300 -0.0174 -0.0236
(-0.62) (-0.25) (-0.36) (-0.55) (-0.33) (-0.45)
LEV
-0.350** -0.351* -0.352* -0.351** -0.352** -0.352**
(-1.97) (-1.97) (-1.97) (-2.00) (-1.97) (-1.98)
Const.
0.0657 0.0384 0.0434 0.0542 0.0685 0.0507
(0.38) (0.21) (0.23) (0.33) (0.34) (0.25)
R² (%) 23.83 18.73 18.55 24.08 19.34 18.74
F 5.46 3.10 3.07 6.98 10.28 2.01
Prob. F 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
Clusters (n) 209 209 209 209 209 209
Observations 722 722 722 722 722 722
Note: NIi,t is earnings per share of company i in year t, scaled by share price at t-1, Ri,t is return on share (the most liquid share 
class) of company i in year t adjusted by dividends and splits (four months after the end of the year) and scaled by share price 
at t-1 (Cn according to model 1). The  rst line shows the coef cients and the second line, the t statistics. Standard error is robust 
and clustered by  rm. The variables LPA and R are scaled by price in t-1 (four months after the beginning of the year).
ACFC = dummy variable if  rm i has both,  scal council and audit committee, installed; AC = dummy variable if  rm i has an 
audit committee installed; CFn = dummy variable if  rm i has a general  scal council installed (FC1), a permanent  scal council 
(FC2), or a powerful  scal council (FC3); Cn = variable that takes values  for FCn, AC, ACFC, or ACOFC; D = dummy variable 
considering 1 if the return is negative and 0, otherwise; LEV = leverage of  rm i in period t; GRO = revenue growth of  rm i in 
period t; ACOFC = dummy variable if  rm i has a  scal council or an audit committee installed; S = natural logarithm of total 
assets of  rm i in period t.
***, **, *: signi cant at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
Source: Prepared by the authors.
Th e results point out that only companies with a 
permanent fi scal council installed, according to column 
5 of Table 6, have an attribute of conditional conservatism, 
recognizing in advance their economic losses in net 
income, since the variable R*D*CF2 has a positive and 
signifi cant coeﬃ  cient of 0.764 (t = 3.05).
Th us, there is evidence of a positive eff ect of the 
presence of a permanent fi scal council as a corporate 
governance mechanism that reinforces the good practices 
suggested by Almeida (2010), Bushman and Smith (2001), 
Lopes and Walker (2008), and Sloan (2001).
Table 7 summarizes the results found for the H1 
hypothesis that the presence in Brazilian companies of 
an audit committee (H1), a fi scal council (H2), an audit 
committee (H3), and both simultaneously (H4) increases 
the quality of accounting information disclosed to the 
market.
n
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5. ROBUSTNESS ANALYSIS
In order to reinforce the evidence found previously, we 
sought to change the variable of interest presence of an 
audit committee and a fi scal council by the independence 
degree of their members.
Th e fi scal council independence was analyzed in two 
ways: (i) members representing minority shareholders, 
elected at the general meeting (thus, independence 
from the controlling shareholders is expected), and (ii) 
independence with management, verifying present and 
past relations between the member and the company or 
economic group by means of item 12.8 of the company 
Reference Form.
As for independence of the audit committee, we 
could only use as a proxy member independence from 
management, because they were not directly elected 
by shareholders, making it impossible to analyze 
independence of the controlling shareholders. Th e number 
of observations in this analysis changed when compared 
to the previous one is due to the fact that some companies 
did not provide the full information, in the company 
Reference Form, of the members’ curricula, both those 
from the fi scal council and the audit committee, something 
which resulted in a decreased number of observations.
Th e variable DIND1 is a dummy variable that takes 
value 1 when the company has at least one member elected 
by minority shareholders and 0 otherwise, the variable 
IND1 measures the percentage of members elected by 
minority shareholders, while the variable DIND2 takes 
value 1 when the company has at least one independent 
member and 0 otherwise, and the variable IND2 measures 
the percentage of independent members.
In the same structure, we analyze relevance, timeliness, 
and conditional conservatism. Table 8 displays results for 
the relevance model.
Table 7 Summary of results for the research hypotheses
Metrics Audit committee (H1)
General fi scal council
(H2)
Powered fi scal council 
(H3)
Both 
(H4)
Relevance Partially confi rmed Partially confi rmed Partially confi rmed Partially confi rmed
Timeliness Not confi rmed Not confi rmed Not confi rmed Not confi rmed
Conservatism Not confi rmed Partially confi rmed Not confi rmed Not confi rmed
Source: Prepared by the authors.
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Table 8 Results of the relevance model (independence)
Model 1
Pi,t = β0 + β1.NIi,t + β2.BVi,t + β 3.ICn + β4.NIi,t*In + β5.BVi,t*In + ∑  .βn.Control + εi,t
Column 1 2 3 4 5 6
Variables
General fi scal council Audit committee
DIND1 IND1 DIND2 IND2 DIND2 IND2
NI
0.311*** 0.271*** 0.287*** 0.240*** 0.185*** 0.192***
(5.52) (3.73) (5.20) (3.90) (3.76) (3.51)
BV
-0.0462*** -0.0383*** -0.0415*** -0.0409*** -0.0218** -0.0232***
(-5.64) (-4.91) (-5.54) (-4.08) (-3.45) (-2.70)
In
0.0320 0.0433 0.0528* 0.0178 0.0201 0.00630
(1.12) (0.74) (1.66) (0.46) (0.47) (0.09)
NI*In
-0.145* -0.134* -0.109 -0.0379 0.535*** 0.489***
(-1.66) (-1.86) (-1.20) (-0.46) (3.76) (3.36)
BV*In
0.0367*** 0.0577* 0.0266** 0.0436 0.0348 0.0646
(3.56) (1.80) (2.32) (1.61) (0.66) (0.80)
S
0.00569 0.00853 0.00336 0.00732 0.00619 0.00629
(0.61) (0.92) (0.35) (0.76) (0.65) (0.65)
GRO
0.106** 0.101** 0.111** 0.107** 0.0849* 0.0903*
(2.16) (2.11) (2.25) (2.17) (1.19) (1.87)
LEV
-0.104*** -0.101*** -0.0994*** -0.108*** -0.0986*** -0.101***
(-2.89) (-2.79) (-2.80) (-2.83) (-1.77) (-2.91)
Const.
0.968*** 0.930*** 0.984*** 0.945*** 0.962*** 0.966***
(6.54) (6.25) (6.47) (6.13) (4.75) (6.26)
R² (%) 11.23 10.74 11.13 10.66 12.16 11.55
F 6.53 6.89 6.64 5.50 9.21 8.49
Prob. F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Clusters (n) 210 210 204 204 208 208
Observations 718 718 700 700 711 711
Note: Pi,t is the share price of company i in year t adjusted by dividends and splits (four months after the end of the year) and 
scaled by share price in t-1, NIi,t is earnings per share of  company i in year t scaled by share price in t-1, BVi,t is equity per share of 
company i in year t, scaled by share price in t-1. The  rst line shows the coef cients and the second line, the t statistics. Standard 
error is robust and clustered by  rm. The variables P, LPA, and PLA are scaled by price in t-1 (four months after the beginning of 
the year).
DINDn = dummy variable if  rm i has at least one independent controller member (DIND1) or administration member (DIND2) 
in the  scal council or the audit committee; LEV = leverage of  rm i in period t; I = variable that takes values  for member 
independence; INDn = percentage of independent controller members (IND1) or administration members (IND2) in the  scal 
council or the audit committee in  rm i; GRO = revenue growth of  rm i in period t; S = natural logarithm of total assets of  rm i 
in period t.
***, **, *: signi cant at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
Source: Prepared by the authors.
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Th e results for relevance indicate that fi scal council 
independence positively impacts equity relevance in 
the two independence analyses and that of the audit 
committee only impacts net income relevance, reinforcing 
the previous results for relevance of analyzing the presence 
of these bodies.
Table 9 displays the results for the timeliness model.
Table 9 Results for the timeliness model (independence)
Model 2
Ri,t = β0 + β1.NIi,t + β2.∆NIi,t + β3 .In + β4.NIi,t*In+ β5. ∆NIi,t*In + ∑  .βn.Control + εi,t
Column 1 2 3 4 5 6
Variables
General fi scal council Audit committee
DIND1 IND1 DIND2 IND2 DIND2 IND2
NI
0.170** 0.143* 0.172** 0.132 0.136*** 0.136***
(2.19) (1.89) (2.20) (1.65) (2.78) (2.79)
∆NI
0.0149 0.00877 0.0148 0.0159 0.0133 0.0135
(0.67) (0.49) (0.65) (0.74) (0.81) (0.86)
In
0.0240 0.0427 0.00995 0.00985 0.0110 0.00468
(1.33) (1.56) (0.59) (0.56) (1.02) (0.40)
NI*In
-0.0575 -0.0176 -0.0510 0.0135 -0.0687 -0.0862
(-0.69) (-0.24) (-0.61) (0.18) (-1.10) (-1.41)
∆NI*In
-0.00937 0.00491 -0.00764 -0.0111 -0.00947 -0.0129
(-0.39) (0.13) (-0.31) (-0.43) (-0.51) (-0.68)
S
0.00366 0.00498 0.00911 0.00983 0.00537 0.00592
(0.34) (0.46) (0.91) (0.97) (0.50) (0.54)
GRO
0.0347 0.0328 0.0315 0.0301 0.0328 0.0330
(1.17) (1.10) (1.05) (0.98) (1.08) (1.09)
LEV
0.0633 0.0592 0.0739 0.0668 0.0573 0.0574
(0.94) (0.88) (1.11) (1.00) (0.89) (0.89)
Const.
-0.109 -0.123 -0.195 -0.201 -0.121 -0.127
(-0.61) (-0.69) (-1.17) (-1.18) (-0.68) (-0.70)
R² (%) 5.23 5.04 7.12 6.92 4.93 4.93
F 2.62 2.63 2.84 3.24 2.66 2.65
Prob. F 0.052 0.050 0.071 0.002 0.049 0.049
Clusters (n) 209 209 203 203 207 207
Observations 688 688 673 673 681 681
Note: Ri,t is return on (the most liquid class) share of company i in year t adjusted by dividends and splits (four months after the 
end of the year) and scaled by share price in t-1, NIi,t is earnings per share of company i in year t and scaled by share price in 
t-1, and ∆BVi,t are changes in net income per share of company i in year t and scaled by share price in t-1 (In according to model 
1). The  rst line shows the coef cients and the second line, the t statistics. Standard error is robust and clustered by  rm. The 
variables P, LPA, and PLA are scaled by price in t-1 (four months after the beginning of the year).
DINDn = dummy variable if  rm i has at least one independent controller member (DIND1) or administration member (DIND2) 
in the  scal council or the audit committee; LEV = leverage of  rm i in period t; I = variable that takes values for member 
independence; INDn = percentage of independent controller members (IND1) or administration members (IND2) in the  scal 
council or the audit committee in  rm i; GRO = revenue growth of  rm i in period t; S = natural logarithm of total assets of  rm i 
in period t.
***, **, *: signi cant at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
Source: Prepared by the authors.
According to the results for timeliness, we cannot 
attest to the eff ect of member independence on earnings 
timeliness and its persistence, as well as when analyzing 
the presence of these bodies.
Table 10 displays the results for the conditional 
conservatism model.
n
1
Vitor Gomes Baioco & José Elias Feres de Almeida
245R. Cont. Fin. – USP, São Paulo, v. 28, n. 74, p. 229-248, mai./ago. 2017
Table 10 Results for the conditional conservatism model (independence)
Model 3
NIi,t = β0 + β1.Di,t + β2.Ri,t + β3.Ri,t*Di,t + β4.In + β5.Di,t*In+ β6.Ri,t*In + β 7.Ri,t*Di,t*In+ ∑  .βn.Control + εi,t
Column 1 2 3 4 5 6
Variables
General fi scal council Audit Committee
DIND1 IND1 DIND2 IND2 DIND2 IND2
D
-0.0758** -0.0471 -0.0814* -0.0535 -0.0768* -0.0739*
(-2.19) (-1.29) (-1.91) (-1.07) (-1.68) (-1.72)
R*D
0.116 0.0955 0.119 0.103 0.271 0.271
(0.55) (0.46) (0.56) (0.48) (1.40) (1.39)
In
-0.0160 -0.00225 -0.0129 0.0163 -0.0248 -0.0329
(-0.52) (-0.07) (-0.42) (0.66) (-0.87) (-0.90)
R*In
-0.0960 -0.158 -0.000721 0.00580 0.0126 -0.146
(-0.52) (-0.41) (-0.00) (0.03) (0.05) (-0.39)
D*In
0.0614 0.0812 0.0842* 0.0549 0.0328 0.0172
(1.49) (0.95) (1.70) (0.89) (0.58) (0.23)
R*D*In
1.486 4.496*** 1.599 1.962* 1.273 1.571
(1.47) (4.04) (1.43) (1.71) (1.43) (1.34)
S
0.0143 0.0164 0.0127 0.0130 0.0164 0.0171
(0.93) (1.10) (0.81) (0.85) (1.02) (1.05)
GRO
-0.0337 -0.0374 -0.0312 -0.0291 -0.0162 -0.0160
(-0.63) (-0.68) (-0.57) (-0.53) (-0.31) (-0.30)
LEV
-0.350* -0.333* -0.345* -0.344* -0.352* -0.353*
(-1.97) (-1.92) (-1.95) (-1.95) (-1.97) (-1.97)
Const.
0.0555 0.00542 0.0722 0.0495 0.0180 0.00867
(0.32) (0.03) (0.41) (0.28) (0.10) (0.05)
R² (%) 23.86 33.83 24.72 26.78 18.76 18.81%
F 5.10 7.11 5.28 6.57 2.94 2.71
Prob. F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.004
Clusters (n) 209 209 203 203 207 207
Observations 722 722 704 704 715 715
Note: NIi,t is earnings per share of company i in year t, scaled by share price at t-1 and Ri,t is return on share (the most liquid 
share class) of company i in year t adjusted by dividends and splits (four months after the end of the year) and scaled by share 
price at t-1 (Cn according to model 1). The  rst line shows the coef cients and the second line, the t statistics. Standard error is 
robust and clustered by  rm. The variables LPA and R are scaled by price in t-1 (four months after the beginning of the year).
D = dummy variable considering 1 if the return is negative and 0, otherwise; DINDn = dummy variable if  rm i has at least one 
independent controller member (DIND1) or administration member (DIND2) in the  scal council or the audit committee; LEV 
= leverage of  rm i in period t; I = variable that takes values for member independence; INDn = percentage of independent 
controller members (IND1) or administration members (IND2) in the  scal council or the audit committee in  rm i; GRO = 
revenue growth of  rm i in period t; S = natural logarithm of total assets of  rm i in period t.
***, **, *: signi cant at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
Source: Prepared by the authors.
According to the results presented in Table 10, the 
percentage of independent members in the fi scal council, 
either elected by minority shareholders or independent 
members, has an impact on reported profi t conservatism. 
However, the results do not point out an association 
between member independence in the audit committee 
and the practice of conditional conservatism.
Th erefore, we notice that member independence in 
the fi scal council managed to change the impact of the 
presence of this body on conditional conservatism. Th e 
results for audit committee independence reinforce the 
evidence found for its presence.
n
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6. FINAL REMARKS
Th is study evaluated the eff ects of the presence of the 
audit committee and the fi scal council and their various 
arrangements on earnings quality of Brazilian public 
companies listed on the BM&FBOVESPA from 2010 
to 2013. Th e metrics to assess earnings quality were: 
relevance, timeliness, and conditional conservatism. Th e 
motivation for conducting this research focused on the 
perspective of these bodies functioning as a mechanism 
of corporate governance, especially in the functions of 
supervision and inspection of the fi nancial reporting 
process.
In general, the results indicated that the bodies under 
study have an eff ect on the quality of accounting fi gures. 
However, a conclusion must be drawn according to each 
research hypothesis, body confi gurations, and accounting 
information properties.
Th e results for the audit committee and the general 
fi scal council indicated impacts only on the relevance of 
accounting information: impact on net income, for the 
audit committee, and on equity, for the general fi scal 
council, partially confi rming the hypotheses H1 e H2.
In parallel, the results pointed out a high impact of the 
audit committee on net income relevance (high coeﬃ  cient 
and signifi cance). Th is evidence may be explained by 
the specifi city of the functions of the committee in the 
fi nancial reporting process, coming from internal controls 
to internal and external audit inspection, while the fi scal 
council has broader functions/powers, but it has the 
possibility of accessing information from the auditors 
and the audit committee when inspecting audited fi nancial 
statements and the executives’ acts.
Th e fact that the general fi scal council has had a 
positive and signifi cant eff ect only on equity relevance 
and a negative eff ect on earnings relevance (although not 
signifi cant) may indicate a greater concern of the fi scal 
council in protecting the shareholders’ equity, while the 
concern of the audit committee may be greater in ensuring 
more reliable data on managers’ performance (contained 
in the income statements).
It is worth highlighting that this assumption is that 
the concerns might be diff erently evidenced in each 
body (greater focus on one or another goal, based on its 
functions and hierarchies). Objectively, if net income is 
relevant to an investor, then the audit committee acts by 
improving fi nancial reporting quality, since its members, 
directly or indirectly, were nominated by controlling and 
minority shareholders, while the fi scal council members 
are predominantly elected by controlling shareholders or 
a group of shareholders, detaching small investors and 
shareholders, and giving greater emphasis to equity, as 
the fi scal council members are elected and directly report 
to shareholders at meetings.
It was expected that the presence of both in the same 
organization might improve the financial reporting 
process. Th e evidence showed an increase in net income 
relevance, but the results for timeliness pointed out 
negative eff ects. Th us, in this scenario, net income is 
relevant to the market, but not in a timely way, something 
which exposes a restriction to the relevance found. Also, 
the existence of one or the other body, in contrast to none, 
only impacted equity relevance.
Th e results obtained in this research pointed out higher 
relevance of net income and equity in companies with 
a permanent fi scal council installed, as well as higher 
conditional conservatism, something which refl ects the 
fi nancial reporting function as a contractual mechanism. 
Th ese results are mutually related, since early recognition 
of economic losses in earnings (conditional conservatism) 
tends to make this information more relevant to the 
market. Such evidence has indicated that fi scal councils 
permanently installed may be considered as more eﬃ  cient 
corporate governance mechanisms than when installed 
only at shareholders’ request.
We also found a positive impact of a powered fi scal 
council only on equity relevance. Th is evidence suggests 
that poor association of a powered fi scal council with 
earnings quality metrics may be a refl ection of the various 
functions of this body, and this can aff ect its focus. Such 
a result may be useful for regulators, market players, and 
shareholders when discussing better corporate governance 
models.
Finally, corporate governance is a complex and dynamic 
system that involves the interaction of a set of components. 
Th us, evaluating the impact of one or the other component 
on earnings quality may be a limiting factor, something 
which gives room for further research in order to deepen 
and improve a major theme for accounting practitioners, 
and above all for accounting information users, seeking 
to relate other governance mechanisms, as well as other 
accounting information properties
Vitor Gomes Baioco & José Elias Feres de Almeida
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